文件名称：BARGAINING
文件大小：189KB
文件格式：PDF
更新时间：2012-08-26 08:54:13
经济
The primary objective of this book is to demonstrate that a firm's financing decision depends among other things on bargaining power considerations and to illustrate potential reasons for this dependency. Based on a principal-agent analysis where a lender (principal) and a firm (agent) bargain how to finance the firm's risky project, it is shown that: the advantages of debt financing increase with the firm's bargaining power; the favorability of private placements in comparison to public offerings increases with a firm's bargaining power; the firm's contract type and placement mode choice are interrelated and must be treated jointly when determining the firm's optimal financing decision; and in the presence of an ex-ante informational asymmetry about the firm's financing and the lenders' profit alternatives the contract agreement probability depends (in a non-monotonous way) on the firm's bargaining power.