[转]iOS Anti-Debugging Protections

source-1: http://www.coredump.gr/articles/ios-anti-debugging-protections-part-1/

source-2: http://www.coredump.gr/articles/ios-anti-debugging-protections-part-2/

Many iOS applications use anti-debugging techniques to prevent malicious users from using a debugger to analyze or modify their behavior. In this first part of the iOS anti-debugging series I will describe one of the most commonly used anti-debugging techniques in iOS nowadays and provide ways to bypass it.

Using ptrace with PT_DENY_ATTACH

Ptrace is a system call that is primarily used to trace and debug applications. The ptrace call is defined as:

int ptrace(int request, pid_t pid, caddr_t addr, int data);

The first argument (request) specifies the operation to perform. All valid operations are defined in /usr/include/sys/ptrace.h. One of the operations is called PT_DENY_ATTACH and has the value 31. When the request is set to that value the application informs the operating system that it doesn’t want to be traced or debugged. Any attempts to trace the process will be denied and the application will receive a segmentation violation.

The following block of code contains an example C program that uses the ptrace call to prevent GDB from debugging it. Currently, GDB is the only debugger that works on iOS devices. The following paragraphs contain an analysis of the protection as well as ways to bypass it.

int main(int argc, char **argv)

{

ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0);

printf("Try to attach to me!");

while (1)

{

sleep(1);

printf(".");

fflush(stdout);

}

return 0;

}

The call to activate the protection is on line 3:

ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0);

When the request is set to PT_DENY_ATTACH all other arguments aren’t used and set to zero.

First, let’s examine the effects of this protection. We will run the application in one terminal and try to attach using GDB in another:

tl0gic:~ mobile$ ./ptrace

Try to attach to me!........

Now we try to attach with GDB:

tl0gic:~ mobile$ ps ax | grep ptrace

2761 s000 S+ 0:00.05 ./ptrace

2774 s001 R+ 0:00.01 grep ptrace

tl0gic:~ mobile$ gdb -p 2761

/private/var/mobile/2761: No such file or directory

Attaching to process 2761.

Segmentation fault: 11

tl0gic:~ mobile$

As you can see GDB terminated with a segmentation fault.

Next, let’s try to start the application from GDB:

tl0gic:~ mobile$ gdb ./ptrace

Reading symbols for shared libraries . done

(gdb) run

Starting program: /private/var/mobile/ptrace

Reading symbols for shared libraries ...................... done

Program exited with code 055.

(gdb)

The application was terminated with exit code 055.

Bypassing ptrace

In the following paragraphs we will describe two different ways to bypass the ptrace protection. In the first, we will modify the arguments of ptrace to invalidate the call, and in the second we will do a memory patch to replace the ptrace call with NOP instructions.

Method 1 – modifying the arguments to ptrace

First, start GDB with the process we want to debug:

$ gdb ./ptrace

Then, setup a breakpoint on ptrace:

(gdb) break ptrace

Function "ptrace" not defined.

Make breakpoint pending on future shared library load? (y or [n]) y

Breakpoint 1 (ptrace) pending.

Note that GDB complains that ptrace isn’t defined. This is normal just select“”y” as the answer. The next step is to start the process. It will take some time for GDB to load all the symbols. At the end it will notify us that it resolved the ptrace symbol and was able to setup the breakpoint. Once the process is started the breakpoint is hit and we are back at the GDB prompt.

Starting program: /private/var/mobile/ptrace

Reading symbols for shared libraries ...................... done

Breakpoint 1 at 0x30e6f3a8

Pending breakpoint 1 - "ptrace" resolved

Breakpoint 1, 0x30e6f3a8 in ptrace ()

(gdb)

Let’s examine the registers. On ARM CPUs the first four registers (r0 to r3) contain the first four arguments to a function call. Since ptrace accepts exactly four arguments we can just print the first four registers to examine the contents of the arguments.

(gdb) info registers r0 r1 r2 r3

r0 0x1f 31

r1 0x0 0

r2 0x0 0

r3 0x0 0

As you can see, r0 contains the number 31, which is the value of PT_DENY_ATTACH. The other registers are all set to zero. As we discussed above when ptrace is invoked with the request set to PT_DENY_ATTACH all other arguments aren’t used so they are set to zero.

At this point we will replace the first argument with an invalid value. Ptrace will try to execute the invalid request and return an error instead. Most applications don’t really check the return value of ptrace for errors and therefore we can get away with it.

(gdb) set $r0=-1

(gdb) continue

Continuing.

Try to attach to me!.....

As you can see the application is running with GDB attached ☺

Method 2 - memory patch

The second way is to do a memory patch when the application is running and remove the call to ptrace completely. We will use otool to disassemble the binary and find the address we need to patch. Then, we will load the application in GDB and patch it.

Lets start by disassembling the application and locating the call to ptrace:

$ otool -tV ./ptrace

00002f20 4610 cpy r0, r2

00002f22 4619 cpy r1, r3

00002f24 461a cpy r2, r3

00002f26 e868f000 blx 0x2ff8 ; symbol stub for: _ptrace

00002f2a 019ef240 blx 0x243268

00002f2e 0100f2c0 blx 0x2c3130

00002f32 4479 add r1, pc

From the disassembly above we can see that the call to ptrace in this binary happens at address 0x2f26 (instruction “blx 0x2ff8”). Also, the opcode is 4 bytes long. Therefore, to completely remove the call we need to replace 4 bytes at address 0x2f26 with one or more instructions that don’t do anything (NOP). There are several opcodes for NOP instructions in ARM, in this patch we will use 0xbf00.

First, we will load the application in GDB and examine the disassembly of address 0x2f26 (where the call to ptrace is):

tl0gic:~ mobile$ gdb ./ptrace

Reading symbols for shared libraries . done

(gdb) x/5i 0x2f26

0x2f26 : blx 0x2ff8

0x2f2a : movw r1, #158 ; 0x9e

0x2f2e : movt r1, #0 ; 0x0

0x2f32 : add r1, pc

0x2f34 : str r0, [sp, #16]

Then, we will setup a breakpoint in main() and start our application. We need to do that because GDB doesn’t have write access to the process’ memory unless the application is running.

(gdb) b main

Breakpoint 1 at 0x2f0e

(gdb) run

Starting program: /private/var/mobile/ptrace

Reading symbols for shared libraries ...................... done

Breakpoint 1, 0x00002f0e in main ()

Now that the breakpoint is hit we are back in GDB and we can perform the memory patch:

(gdb) set *(long *)0x2f26 = 0xbf00bf00

Note that we are casting the address 0x2f26 to a type of long so that GDB knows how many bytes to write at the address. In this case we know that the call to ptrace is 4 bytes long so we are using a long type which is also 4 bytes. Note that the value we are writing is 0xbf00bf00 and contains two NOPs. We need to use two NOPs because each NOP is two bytes. After we execute the command we will examine the disassembly one more time to verify that we patched the application properly:

(gdb) x/5i 0x2f26

0x2f26 : nop

0x2f28 : nop

0x2f2a : movw r1, #158 ; 0x9e

0x2f2e : movt r1, #0 ; 0x0

0x2f32 : add r1, pc

(gdb) continue

Continuing.

Try to attach to me!.........

As you can see the instruction at address 0x2f26 is a NOP instruction and is followed by another NOP instruction. The call to ptrace is completely gone. We can now use the GDB command “continue” to continue execution.

=============================================================================

In the previous part (iOS Anti-Debugging Protections: Part 1) we discussed about ptrace and how it can be used to prevent a debugger from attaching to a process. This post describes a technique that is commonly used to detect the presence of a debugger. Note that unlike the ptrace technique this method doesn’t prevent a debugger from attaching to a process. Instead, it uses the sysctl function to retrieve information about the process and determine whether it is being debugged. Apple has an article in their Mac Technical Q&As with sample code that uses this method: Detecting the Debugger

The sysctl call is defined as:

int sysctl(int *name, u_int namelen, void *oldp, size_t *oldlenp, void *newp, size_t newlen);

The first argument name is an array of integers that describe the type of information we are requesting. Apple describes this name as a “Management Information Base” (MIB) style name in the sysctl man page. The second argument contains the number of integers in the name array. The third and fourth arguments hold the output buffer and the output buffer size respectively. These arguments will be populated with the requested information when the function returns. Arguments five and six are only used when setting information.

The following block of code contains an example C program that uses a sysctl call to determine whether it is being debugged. The next paragraphs contain an analysis of the protection as well as information on how to bypass it.

#include <stdio.h>

#include <sys/types.h>

#include <unistd.h>

#include <sys/sysctl.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

static int is_debugger_present(void)

{

int name[4];

struct kinfo_proc info;

size_t info_size = sizeof(info);

info.kp_proc.p_flag = 0;

name[0] = CTL_KERN;

name[1] = KERN_PROC;

name[2] = KERN_PROC_PID;

name[3] = getpid();

if (sysctl(name, 4, &info, &info_size, NULL, 0) == -1) {

perror("sysctl");

exit(-1);

}

return ((info.kp_proc.p_flag & P_TRACED) != 0);

}

int main (int argc, const char * argv[])

{

printf("Looping forever");

fflush(stdout);

while (1)

{

sleep(1);

if (is_debugger_present())

{

printf("Debugger detected! Terminating...\n");

return -1;

}

printf(".");

fflush(stdout);

}

return 0;

}

The call to sysctl is on line 20:

sysctl(name, 4, &info, &info_size, NULL, 0)

First, lets analyze the arguments of the sysctl call. The first argument name is initialized as:

name[0] = CTL_KERN;

name[1] = KERN_PROC;

name[2] = KERN_PROC_PID;

name[3] = getpid();

The item at index 0 is set to CTL_KERN. This is the top-level name for kernel-specific information. All the available top-level names have a prefix of “CTL_” and are defined in the header file /usr/include/sys/sysctl.h. The item at index 1 is set to KERN_PROC. This indicates that sysctl will return a struct with process entries. The next item KERN_PROC_PID specifies that the target process will be selected based on a process ID (PID). Finally, the last item is the PID of that process.

The second argument of sysctl (size) is set to 4 since this is the total number of items in the name. Arguments three and four are set to the output buffer and its size. The output buffer is a struct of type kinfo_proc which is defined in /usr/include/sys/sysctl.h. The struct contains another struct (kp_proc) of type extern_proc that is defined in /usr/include/sys/proc.h. The kp_proc struct contains information about the process including a flag (p_flag) that describes the process state. All the valid values for p_flag can be found in /usr/include/sys/proc.h. The following block contains some sample values from that file:

#define P_TIMEOUT 0x00000400 /* Timing out during sleep */

#define P_TRACED 0x00000800 /* Debugged process being traced */

#define P_DISABLE_ASLR 0x00001000 /* Disable ASLR */

The P_TRACED value is set when the process is being debugged. The following line of code in the sample program checks if the value is set:

return ((info.kp_proc.p_flag & P_TRACED) != 0);

Bypassing the sysctl check

This type of check can be bypassed by clearing the contents of the p_flag variable after the call returns. The following paragraphs contain step-by-step instructions on how to accomplish that with the help of GDB.

First, load the application in GDB:

tl0gic:~ mobile$ gdb ./sysctl

Reading symbols for shared libraries . done

(gdb)

Setup a conditional breakpoint on sysctl:

(gdb) break sysctl if $r1==4 && *(int *)$r0==1 && *(int *)($r0+4)==14 && *(int *)($r0+8)==1

This breakpoint will be triggered only if the size argument of sysctl (in $r1) has a value of 4 and the first three items in the name array (at addresses $r0, $r0+4, and $r0+8) are equal to CTL_KERN (1), KERN_PROC (14) and KERN_PROC_PID (1).

Run the process until the breakpoint is hit:

(gdb) run

Starting program: /private/var/mobile/sysctl

Reading symbols for shared libraries ...................... done

Looping forever

Breakpoint 1, 0x35b60672 in sysctl ()

(gdb)

Save the value of $r2, this is the address of output buffer where sysctl will store the process information: (gdb) set $pinfo=$r2

Continue executing until the sysctl call is complete:

(gdb) finish

Run till exit from #0 0x35b60672 in sysctl ()

0x00002ed6 in is_debugger_present ()

(gdb)

Before we continue to the next step we need to setup a breakpoint at the end of sysctl. We will use that breakpoint later to automate this process (don’t worry about the breakpoint condition for now):

(gdb) break *$pc if $pinfo!=-1

Now we need to find the exact offset of the p_flag value inside the output buffer. There are two ways to accomplish that:

Sum the bytes for each of the struct elements that precede the p_flag
Disassemble the sample application and find how the compiler calculates it.

We will go with the second option. The following block contains the disassembly for the is_debugger_present function:

_is_debugger_present:

00002e68 b580 push {r7, lr}

00002e6a 466f mov r7, sp

00002e6c f5ad7d05 sub.w sp, sp, #532 @ 0x214

00002e70 f24010c0 movw r0, 0x1c0

00002e74 f2c00000 movt r0, 0x0

00002e78 4478 add r0, pc

00002e7a 6800 ldr r0, [r0, #0]

00002e7c 6800 ldr r0, [r0, #0]

00002e7e 9084 str r0, [sp, #528]

00002e80 2001 movs r0, #1

00002e82 f2c00000 movt r0, 0x0

00002e86 210e movs r1, #14

00002e88 f2c00100 movt r1, 0x0

00002e8c 2200 movs r2, #0

00002e8e f2c00200 movt r2, 0x0

00002e92 f24013ec movw r3, 0x1ec

00002e96 f2c00300 movt r3, 0x0

00002e9a 9304 str r3, [sp, #16]

00002e9c 9209 str r2, [sp, #36]

00002e9e 9080 str r0, [sp, #512]

00002ea0 9181 str r1, [sp, #516]

00002ea2 9082 str r0, [sp, #520]

00002ea4 f000e8a2 blx 0x2fec @ symbol stub for: _getpid

00002ea8 2104 movs r1, #4

00002eaa f2c00100 movt r1, 0x0

00002eae ab04 add r3, sp, #16

00002eb0 2200 movs r2, #0

00002eb2 f2c00200 movt r2, 0x0

00002eb6 f10d0914 add.w r9, sp, #20 @ 0x14

00002eba f50d7c00 add.w ip, sp, #512 @ 0x200

00002ebe 9083 str r0, [sp, #524]

00002ec0 4660 mov r0, ip

00002ec2 9203 str r2, [sp, #12]

00002ec4 464a mov r2, r9

00002ec6 f8dd900c ldr.w r9, [sp, #12]

00002eca f8cd9000 str.w r9, [sp]

00002ece f8cd9004 str.w r9, [sp, #4]

00002ed2 f000e894 blx 0x2ffc @ symbol stub for: _sysctl

00002ed6 f1100f01 cmn.w r0, #1 @ 0x1

00002eda d10c bne.n 0x2ef6

00002edc f24000f1 movw r0, 0xf1

00002ee0 f2c00000 movt r0, 0x0

00002ee4 4478 add r0, pc

00002ee6 f000e884 blx 0x2ff0 @ symbol stub for: _perror

00002eea f64f70ff movw r0, 0xffff

00002eee f6cf70ff movt r0, 0xffff

00002ef2 f000e878 blx 0x2fe4 @ symbol stub for: _exit

00002ef6 f240103a movw r0, 0x13a

00002efa f2c00000 movt r0, 0x0

00002efe 4478 add r0, pc

00002f00 6800 ldr r0, [r0, #0]

00002f02 9909 ldr r1, [sp, #36]

00002f04 f4016100 and.w r1, r1, #2048 @ 0x800

00002f08 6800 ldr r0, [r0, #0]

00002f0a 9a84 ldr r2, [sp, #528]

00002f0c 4290 cmp r0, r2

00002f0e 9102 str r1, [sp, #8]

00002f10 d103 bne.n 0x2f1a

00002f12 9802 ldr r0, [sp, #8]

00002f14 f50d7d05 add.w sp, sp, #532 @ 0x214

00002f18 bd80 pop {r7, pc}

At 0x2eb6 the base address of the kinfo_proc struct is calculated as $sp+20 and loaded in $r9. Then, at 0x2ec4 the address is copied into $r2 (the third argument of sysctl). Once the sysctl call (at 0x2f02) has returned the p_flag value is loaded as $sp+36. Therefore, the offset of the p_flag is $sp+20-($sp+36) = 16 bytes. However, $r2 contains the address of the kinfo_struct and not the actual contents. To access the value of the p_flag we will have to use a pointer as illustrated below:

(gdb) printf "0x%x\n", *(int *)($pinfo+16)

0x5802

The value of P_TRACED is 0×800. Therefore, a logical end with the current value should return 0×800 (or 2048 in base 10) when the flag is set:

(gdb) print (*(int *)($pinfo+16) & 0x800)

$5 = 2048

The flag is correctly set (since we have a debugger attached to the process). The next step is to clear it:

(gdb) set $pflag = (*(int *)($pinfo+16))

(gdb) set *(int *)($pinfo+16) = $pflag & ~0x800

Let’s print the value one more time to verify that it’s properly cleared:

(gdb) print (*(int *)($pinfo+16) & 0x800)

$6 = 0

Now that the flag is cleared we can continue executing the process:

(gdb) continue

Continuing.

.

Breakpoint 1, 0x35b60672 in sysctl ()

(gdb)

The breakpoint is hit again because the application is running the sysctl check inside a while loop. We need to have GDB execute all the commands we used above every time a breakpoint is triggered. To accomplish that we can use the “commands” gdb command: GDB commands for the sysctl breakpoint:

commands 1

silent

set $pinfo=$r2

continue

end

GDB commands for the breakpoint after sysctl has returned:

commands 2

silent

set $pflag = (*(int *)($pinfo+16))

set *(int *)($pinfo+16) = $pflag & ~0x800

set $pinfo=-1

continue

end

On the above commands make sure to replace the numbers 1 and 2 with the correct breakpoint numbers. GDB prints the breakpoint number every time a breakpoint is set. We can also use the “info breakpoints” commands to display all the breakpoints.

Now we can resume execution.

(gdb) cont

Continuing.

............

The application runs without detecting the debugger :)

秒客网

[转]iOS Anti-Debugging Protections

Using ptrace with PT_DENY_ATTACH

Bypassing ptrace

Method 1 – modifying the arguments to ptrace

Method 2 - memory patch

Bypassing the sysctl check

相关文章